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Blood Revenge and Violent Mobilization 
 
Evidence from the Chechen Wars 
Emil Aslan Souleimanov and Huseyn Aliyev 
  
Despite a considerable amount of anthropological research into the phenomena of blood 
revenge and blood feud, little is known about the role of blood revenge as a cause of violent 
mobilization in irregular wars. Blood revenge, or the practice of seeking blood retribution for a grave 
offense committed against an individual or his or her relatives, has been practiced since the dawn of 
humankind. In recent years, it has functioned as an important apolitical mechanism in encouraging 
violent mobilization in irregular wars, including against foreigners.  
 Scholars in disciplines as varied as anthropology, sociology, psychology, and criminology have 
explored the phenomenon of blood revenge in depth. In  his seminal work on blood revenge among 
Yanomamo tribes of the Amazon basin, Napoleon Chagnon stated that “[b]lood revenge is one of the 
most commonly cited causes of violence and warfare in tribal societies.”  
1 Some scholars have examined the practice of blood revenge in conflict-ridden societies, including 
those in Albania, Chechnya, Yemen, and Colombia.2 Overall, however, the literature on political 
violence and conflict studies has yet to offer a comprehensive, systematic empirical account of how 
blood revenge manifests itself in in contemporary irregular wars.  
 This study takes a step toward filling this gap by presenting a detailed empirical analysis of the 
role of blood revenge as a cause of violent mobilization in irregular wars. In contrast to the literature on 
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blood revenge in tribal or premodern warfare and on blood revenge as a form of social violence and 
social justice,3 this study argues that blood revenge has much wider application in conflict 
environments than scholars generally have assumed. We empirically ground this proposition in a 
contextualized and systematic examination of blood revenge practices during the anti-Russian 
insurgencies in Chechnya from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s.  
 We begin by conceptualizing the term “blood revenge.” Drawing insights from the extensive 
literature on blood revenge in anthropology, ethnography, and sociology, we then examine the 
theoretical implications of blood revenge for the discipline of conflict studies. This section also 
analyzes the importance of blood revenge in several major present-day irregular wars, including those 
in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and Somalia. Next, we categorize blood revenge as an apolitical, 
grievance-driven cause of violent mobilization in irregular wars. These conceptual and theoretical 
sections are followed by a section on methods and data. The subsequent empirical sections present our 
case study and report our findings on the practice of blood revenge among Chechens during the First 
Chechen War (1994–96) and the Second Chechnya War (1999–present day) in Russia’s North Caucasus 
region.  
 
Conceptualizing Blood Revenge  
 
The words “revenge,” “feud,” “vengeance,” “retribution,” and “retaliation” have many meanings. In 
contrast, the term “blood revenge” typically refers to a more specific, context-bound form of 
“revenge”: a desire to kill an offender or his4 (usually patrilineally delineated) male relatives in 
retaliation for a grave offense committed against oneself or one’s relatives. Traditionally, blood revenge 
is an individual act of revenge against either the perpetrator of an offense or a member of a group 
associated with the offender through blood kinship. But, as this article illustrates, when would-be 
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avengers are unable to identify or locate a group associated with the offender through blood kinship, 
they may exact blood revenge on the narrowest possible group which they are able to associate with the 
offender. We therefore propose a broader definition of blood revenge: specifically, blood revenge is as 
an individual act of revenge against the perpetrator of an offense, or a member of a group associated 
with the offender through blood kinship, or against a broader group associated with the offender not 
necessarily related to him by virtue of blood kinship. Although in this broader understanding, blood 
revenge is not sought exclusively against the offender’s relatives, it does have the same 
characteristics. In other words, blood revenge has to be individual, reciprocal (in the sense that it is 
triggered by an offense against oneself or one’s relatives), selective (in the sense of selecting the 
targets of revenge), equivalent (i.e., grounded in the principle of “eye-for-an-eye”), and resulting in, or 
at least with the intention of, causing death.  
 “Blood feud” is a concept closely associated with blood revenge.5 Whereas blood revenge is 
normally understood as a single act of revenge, blood feud is a process likely to encompass multiple 
acts of blood revenge. Indeed, blood feud is a process involving at least one act of blood revenge. In 
practice, it involves a series of acts of blood revenge. Karina Schumann and Michael Ross consider 
blood feuds “retaliatory cycles of violence between warring families or clans.”6  Unlike blood revenge, 
which may end with the death or punishment of an offender, a blood feud may endure for generations, 
with one act of blood revenge being followed by a retaliatory act of revenge in an endless cycle of tit-
for-tat violence. As Trevor Dean observed in his study of an identical South Italian custom, “Vendetta 
was an obligation on kinsmen. That obligation did not die with an injured part.”7    
 The custom of blood revenge exhibits common characteristics across societies that practice it. 
First, it is closely tied to the notion of honor. Described in anthropological studies as an inseparable 
attribute of honor in honorific cultures,8 blood revenge is, most of all, exacted to defend or restore one’s 
honor.9 As Jon Elster observed, “Honor…is central in all feuding societies.”10  A source of pride and 
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virtue in honorific cultures, it is “an attribute of free, independent men, not of women, slaves, servants, 
or other ‘small men’.”11 The failure to exact blood revenge in honorific cultures is tantamount to the 
loss of one’s honor. Describing the Palestinian custom of taking revenge, Sharon Lang explains that 
“[t]o avenge the murder of a close kinsman is honorable; to fail to do so is dishonorable.”12 The honor-
based role of blood revenge in many cultures is socially sanctioned.13 For example, “[i]n Corsica, the 
man who has not avenged his father, an assassinated relative or a deceived daughter can no longer 
appear in public. Nobody speaks to him; he has to remain silent.”14 Blood revenge is thus obligatory. 
Failure to pursue to it may result in social sanctions targeting not only the individual who failed to 
retaliate, but also his entire kinship group. Writing about Iraq, Patricio Asfura-Heim states that an 
individual’s “[f]ailure to fulfill the obligation of ’thar [blood revenge] badly damages the group’s 
reputation; it is a loss of honor that weakens the group vis-à-vis other groups.”15  
 Second, blood revenge is reciprocal, as discussed in ethnographic work of Adamson Hoebel and 
Geoffrey MacCormack.16 The principle of reciprocity is also embedded in contemporary blood-revenge 
practices. For example, it is a component of Albania’s customary code Kanun, which sanctions blood 
revenge for spilt blood.17 It is also encoded in the Albanian saying “Blood is never lost,” the similar 
Chechen saying “Chechens never forgive blood,” and the Arab saying “Blood demands blood.” 
 Third, blood revenge is grounded in the notion of equivalence. The biblical principle of an eye-
for-an-eye, which is used to justify most acts of blood revenge, prescribes that one life be taken for 
each life lost or for an offense of similar gravity, such as rape or grievous injury. Islamic criminal 
jurisprudence explicitly recognizes the concept of equal––and therefore just––retaliation (qisas) applied 
against the offender but not his relatives.18 Writing about blood revenge in medieval Iceland and 
England, William Miller explained that “[t]aking ten lives for one was not feud; it was either war or 
anarchy.”19 Peter Waldmann observed that in Montenegro, “one kept track of the number of dead on 
both sides (in order to avoid mistakes).”20   
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 Historically, the practice of blood feud has thrived in tribal societies that lack a central political 
authority or centralized state structures as a “mechanism of social control and the maintenance of a 
balance of power.”21 The practice of blood feud has largely disappeared in societies that have 
undergone industrial development, the establishment of centralized government, the strengthening of 
state authority, or the decomposition of tribal or clan societies. Nevertheless, it continues to survive and 
thrive in some parts of the world. In addition to the tribes of the Amazon basin22 and other hunter-
gatherer indigenous communities of South and Central America, sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia 
and Oceania,23 blood revenge is currently practiced in the Pakhtun (Pashtun) areas of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan,24 Sunni tribal areas in Iraq,25 parts of Yemen,26 vast swathes of Somalia,27 and southeast 
Turkey,28 as well as among the northern Albanians (Ghegs) of Albania and Kosovo,29 Bedouin tribes in 
North Africa,30 and Chechens and Ingush in the northeastern Caucasus.31 Even in those societies that 
have undergone industrialization and experienced living under a centralized authority, such as 
Albanians under communism and Iraqi tribes under the rule of the Baath Party, the retreat of the state 
resulted in the revival of blood revenge.  
 
Blood Revenge and Violent Conflict 
  
Anthropological research on blood revenge has focused primarily on its practice as an intra-group 
phenomenon occurring within one (sub)ethnic group or among a group of locally based families, clans, 
or tribes. As seen from this perspective, “[f]euds…are conflicts that occur within the same political 
community.”32 In general, this scholarship has not examined cases of blood revenge against foreigners.  
 scholars studying irregular wars have on occasion discussed the phenomena of revenge, 
feuds, retribution, and reprisal, using these terms interchangeably.33 In addition, several recent 
case studies have mention blood revenge, blood feud, and related phenomena, An empirical 
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analysis by Karen Ericksen and Heather Horton of instances of blood feud around the world—a 
hitherto single quantitative study on the phenomenon—concluded that there seems to be “no 
relationship” between blood feuds and warfare. Rather, “feuding was found to be associated 
primarily with concerns about premarital chastity and mode of marriage.”34  No study has so far 
focused on the role of blood feud as a cause of violent mobilization in irregular wars.  
 For instance, David Kilcullen argues that “violent or foreign-based intervention” in 
Afghanistan “creates…a desire for revenge when local people are killed or are dishonored by 
the intervening outsiders’ presence.”35 Additionally, he shows that many members of the 
Taliban fighting against U.S. and other coalition troops following the invasion in 2001 were 
not religious zealots, but tribesmen seeking blood revenge on behalf of  family members who 
were killed in air raids or drone strikes or who were forced to abandon their homes and 
livestock in the wake of bombings or other war-related violence. According to Kilcullen, 
“Religious extremism and support for the old Taliban regime are rarer motivations, according 
to Afghan intelligence officers and local officials with whom I discussed this; desire for 
revenge (badal) and anger arising from the loss of relatives in the fighting or from killing of 
bystanders and destruction of property through ‘collateral damage’ are more common.”36 
The practice of badal among Pakhtun tribes in Afghanistan is encoded in the customary law of 
Pakhtunwali, and it is considered both a social norm and a moral obligation.37 Qasim Mahdi refers to 
badal as the “cornerstone” of local customary law and defines it as “an action taken to avenge death, or 
when the honor of a woman has been involved.”38 Mahdi writes that “if a man is well-protected enough 
to escape badal himself, it is extremely doubtful that the protection can be extended to his kin, or the 
successive generations, who would constitute legitimate targets of badal.”39  This explanation 
illustrates that when Pakhtun tribesmen cannot exact revenge on the individual(s) directly responsible 
for, say, the death of a family member killed in an air strike, they may turn their sights on those with 
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less direct responsibility—for example, anyone associated with the international presence in the 
country or Afghan armed forces within reach. Thomas Barfield notes that, according to the principles 
of badal, “[i]f one man murdered another, the murdered man’s kin were collectively obligated to seek 
blood revenge. Similarly the murderer’s kin were collectively responsible for his act (and might even 
be targets in revenge killings), even though they had no direct role in it.”40  Sean Maloney claims that 
“blood feuds involving RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades] and AK-47s are not necessarily Taliban 
violence, nor are they necessarily insurgent violence.”41  Indeed, the rise of insurgent violence in 
Kandahar Province from 2003 to 2007 was, to a significant extent, a response to the heavy-handed 
policies of the Afghan government and the indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas by NATO forces.42  
 In Iraq the custom of blood revenge assumed a different form after the 2003 U.S. 
invasion in 2003. In his analysis of the causes of violent mobilization in Iraq's so-called Sunni 
triangle in the period 2004–05, William McCallister writes: “There is nothing immoral about 
killing an individual so long as he is not a kinsman or an ally. An unprotected individual can be 
killed without fear of reprisal from his kinship group. An individual belonging to a clan or tribe 
is protected, since his death would incur the enmity of the extended family. To maintain a 
credible deterrent capability, the tribal sheikh must be prepared to avenge each and every 
injury.”43 
Therefore, the failure sheikhs to avenge the deaths of tribesmen killed in raids or bombing attacks 
directly undermined their authority., forcing them to conduct retaliatory attacks on coalition troops and 
Iraqi authorities. Roel Meijer argues that the atrocities and indiscriminate violence committed by the 
U.S. military in Sunni areas of Iraq, as well as its general disrespect for local traditions, “transformed 
the concept of blood revenge (tha’r), basically a tribal term that has no Islamic connotation, into a 
principle of international war by stating that, ‘we will avenge every Iraqi and Muslim anywhere, not 
only in Iraq.’”44 According to Meijer, “In the chaotic and lawless circumstances of the American 
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occupation blood revenge had become the only means to uphold the honor and dignity of the clan as it 
was impossible to have recourse to a court where compensation could be demanded from the 
Americans who were responsible for death of family members.”45 Meijer dates the start of anti-
American protests in Fallujah in 2004 to the desire of local tribesmen’s desire to exact blood revenge 
for injustices inflicted on them by U.S. troops.46 Asfura-Heim argues that the 2014 takeover of Iraq’s 
Sunni areas by Islamic State (IS) militants was greatly facilitated by blood feuds between local Sunni 
and Shiite tribes. Such feuds prompted Sunnis to assist IS against the Shiite-dominated government in 
Baghdad and the predominantly Shiite-manned Iraqi security forces.47 
 The practice of blood revenge has also played a prominent role in Yemen’s civil violence.48 One 
report states that 4,698 people were killed in tha’r-related violence between pro-government Sunni 
tribes and anti-government Shiite tribes from 1998 to 2008.49  In all, more than 10,000 Yemenis died in 
blood feuds during that period.50 The widespread practice of blood revenge between the Sunni 
government and Shiite insurgents, wrote Sarah Phillips, “led to cycles of inter-tribe violence spanning 
generations and dominating the political and economic landscape.”51  
 The practice of blood revenge (godob) in Somalia has been described as fundamental in both 
fueling inter-clan feuds and contributing to the cycle of violence that has ravaged the country since the 
early 1990s.52 Jama Mohamed identified blood revenge as the “most common cause” of warfare in 
contemporary Somalia.53 Although the number of verifiable reports on blood revenge against African 
Union troops stationed in Somalia are limited, blood feuds between Somalia’s warring factions and 
clans occur regularly.54  
 The Afghan and Iraqi examples of blood revenge discussed above illustrate that, in some 
instances, the practice of blood revenge may be extended to targeting external belligerents,. Because 
failure to seek blood revenge would undermine the status and position of the afflicted individual or 
group within the honor-based society, it is in the interest of that individual or group’s to pursue the 
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offenders at any cost. In some cases, the result is a vicious cycle of attacks and counterattacks. 
Eventually, groups of tribesmen with no political or religious motivations may join one of the principal 
belligerents of the conflict, fight alongside them to exact blood revenge.55   
 
Blood Revenge in the Typology of Causes of Violent Mobilization 
 
When considering whether join an irregular war, individuals are usually driven by a variety of 
motives.56 Scholarship on the causes of violent mobilization has posited a variety of possible 
incentives, which are often difficult to disentangle.57  This scholarship has been heavily influenced by 
the “greed versus grievance” paradigm.58 The grievances-based dimension of participation in irregular 
wars prioritizes sociopolitical and socioeconomic explanations for their decision to mobilize. For 
example, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler propose four major categories of grievances: “ethnic or 
religious hatred, political oppression, political exclusion and economic inequality.”59 These major 
categories continue to dominate the current research on causes of irregular wars. 
           While research on grievances has dominated studies on political violence since World War II, the 
economic incentives for participation in irregular and civil wars have attracted more attention since the 
1960s.60 Originating with Mancur Olson’s collective action theory and dubbed “greed-based 
motivations” material incentives for participation in conflicts are based on an individual’s tendency to 
carefully weigh the costs and benefits of his or her prospective behavior;61 that is, personal incentive is 
the key to understanding an individual’s behavior. For example, group members will hesitate to act in 
line with what appears to be their common interest if they do not expect to gain personally. Should the 
prospective costs of risky behavior outweigh the prospective benefits on an individual level, the 
individual, being essentially rational and self-interested, will refrain from taking collective action.  
In accordance with the above discussion, we categorize blood revenge as an underexplored type 
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of grievance. The categorization of blood revenge in the typology of causes of violent mobilization 
highlights its apolitical, nonmaterial character in irregular wars, distinguishing it from other kinds of 
grievances. Unlike other kinds of grievances, blood revenge encourages individual rather than 
collective mobilization. And in contrast to popular grievances stemming from economic and political 
discrimination, blood revenge is more context-bound and does not lead to large-scale violent 
mobilization. Only those individuals directly affected by violence, or whose relatives have been 
affected by it, resort to blood revenge.  
 
Data and Methods  
 
This article draws empirical insights from thirty-eight in-depth, semi-structured qualitative interviews 
conducted from 2007 to 2013 with former Chechen insurgents and witnesses in Chechnya’s two wars. 
Twenty-one of the interviewees participated in the armed resistance . Seventeen others  were witnesses 
who did not personally participate in the hostilities. The data collected from the interviews pertain to 
the periods 1994–96 and 1999–2006.  
 Given the lack of security in present-day Chechnya and sensitivities around the subject of blood 
revenge,62 the bulk of the ethnographic fieldwork for this study was conducted within Chechen émigré 
communities in Istanbul (September 2007, May 2009, December 2011, and September 2012); Vienna 
(November 2007); London (November 2011); Copenhagen (September 2012); and Oslo (March 2013). 
Again for security reasons, participants consented to being interviewed only on the condition of strict 
confidentiality. For this reason, we conceal their identities in this study.  
 We used snowballing and referral nonprobabilistic methods to select interview participants. The 
sample includes predominantly Chechen males between the ages of thirty-four and sixty-five, 
originating from different parts of the republic. Given the nature of the sample and the limited number 
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of participants, this study does not claim statistical representativeness.63 Nor does it seek to offer 
deterministic proof of a causal relationship between blood revenge and violent mobilization in irregular 
wars. Rather, it aims to provide empirically supported ethnographic evidence on the practices of blood 
revenge during the First and Second Chechen Wars. 
 
Chechen Society: Getting Mad and Getting Even 
 
Despite the ongoing processes of modernization and urbanization in Chechnya, traditional 
sociocultural values and archaic patterns of social organization remain largely intact among the 
Chechen people. These patterns are evident in the persistence of three key phenomena: clan identity, 
the concept of honor, and the custom of blood revenge. 
 Chechnya is a clan society. Chechens identify themselves as belonging to one of roughly 150 
teips or large clans, which are sometimes referred to as tribes. Teips are subdivided into several 
branches (gars), the latter being split into patronymic families (nekyes). Nekyes, in turn, are subdivided 
into groups of related families spanning up to seven generations (shchin-nakhs), which are further 
subdivided into nuclear families (dözals). The ongoing transformation of Chechnya’s clan system has 
meant that smaller in-groups, such as gars and nekyes, where people still have personalized knowledge 
of one other, have replaced teips as an important source of collective identity.64  
 Norms of local customary law (adat), which are centered on the ethical codex of male honor 
(k’onakhalla), continue to play a considerable role in the lives of ordinary Chechens. The archaic 
code of honor constitutes the cornerstone of Chechen society, regulating relationships between males 
and females, those among different age groups, and so on. In gender-related terms, the honor of an 
unwed female rests in her premarital chastity and that of a married female in her fidelity to her husband 
and his family. In contrast, the perception of male honor is largely unrelated to the patriarchal notion of 
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sexuality. Rather, it is linked primarily to three characteristics: courage, hospitality, and generosity. In 
addition, a male’s honor lies in his ability to safeguard the honor of the women related to him and to his 
clan, as well as his ability to provide financially for his close relatives and to keep them safe.  
 A male’s honor is also tied to his ability to avenge an offense inflicted against him or his 
(patrilineally defined) relatives—male or female. Severe offenses historically include extreme verbal 
humiliation, physical injury leading to incapacity or death, and especially manslaughter or rape.65 Such 
blood insults can lead to the declaration of a blood feud (ch’ir) by the individual directly offended or 
by one or more of his or her male relatives. The restoration of an offended individual’s honor (or that of 
his clan), requires the offense be “washed off” with the blood of either the culprit, his brothers, or his 
cousins. 
 The inability of an offended individual or his clan to avenge a blood insult may produce 
opprobrium both inside and outside the clan. Failure to retaliate is considered a sign of weakness 
or cowardice. This notion of “losing face” applies not only to the would-be avenger, but also to 
the clan of which he or she is a member. The initial act of retaliation transforms the offender into the 
offended, creating a vicious cycle of reciprocal violence that can last for generations, because blood 
feuds have no expiration date.66 
 
Blood Feud as a Cause of Violent Mobilization in Chechnya  
 
Numerous scholarly accounts identified blood revenge–based retaliation as an important cause 
of violent mobilization in Chechnya’s two wars.67 Similarly, the majority of journalistic 
reports stressed the role of Chechens’ clan-based social organization and  sociocultural values in 
shaping the nature and dynamics of those wars. As one American journalist covering the First 
Chechen War stated in 1995, “Now that Russia has unleashed a war in which hundreds––
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perhaps thousands––of Chechens have died, the concept of blood revenge has become a 
national mantra. A family that has lost a son, a daughter, a father or mother to the war must seek 
to avenge those deaths.”68 
Our interviews with former Chechen insurgents confirmed this observation, highlighting the 
need to restore their individual and clan honor through blood revenge as a key reason for their violent 
mobilization.69 Failure to do so would have been too heavy of a burden to bear.70 Indeed, many 
interviewees referred to the social context of such failure and their fear of being considered cowardly 
and weak.71 As one veteran of the First Chechen War stated, “After what the [Russian] soldiers did to 
my household, it wasn’t possible for me to stay home and pretend nothing had happened. I couldn’t 
have looked people in the eye.”72 In the words of a veteran of the Second Chechen War, “one’s failure 
to avenge would be tantamount to losing face in your own eyes and in the eyes of the people. You'd 
simply cease to be a Chechen anymore.”73 
 As mentioned earlier, scholarship on the causes of violent mobilization in irregular wars 
suggests that people rarely mobilize for only one reason. But in our interviews with former insurgents, 
blood revenge often featured as the sole motive. In some instances, a would-be avenger might have also 
had a political motivation for joining the fight, such as support for Chechen independence. In other 
instances, he might have mobilized in spite of his political convictions or lack thereof. Regardless, 
blood revenge was enougha motive to prompt the decision to participate in the armed conflict.74  
 The same was true for interviewees who decided to join the conflict in spite of their apolitical 
stance or disapproval of Chechen separatism. In fact, prior to the Russian invasion in late 1994 and the 
bloody confrontation that followed, Chechen society was not united in its effort to gain independence 
from Moscow. Sociological surveys conducted before the outbreak of hostilities that showed a 
relatively high percentage of Chechens wanted their country to remain part of Russia. One survey, 
conducted in Chechnya in mid-1991, indicated that about 60 percent of the respondents wanted their 
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republic to stay within the Soviet Union/Russia. Only around twenty-four percent favored full 
independence.75 Since the early 1990s, many Chechens have remained deeply divided over their 
support for—or opposition to—Chechnya’s separatist elites. In the past, many Chechens in Chechnya 
as well as members of the Chechen diaspora in Europe routinely accused these elites not only of 
infighting, corruption, and clientelism, but of sparking wars and bringing the Chechen people to the 
brink of physical extinction because of their myopic policies with regard to Moscow.76  
 Participants in our interviews stressed their initially apolitical position or ambivalence 
regarding the idea of Chechen statehood and the Chechen separatist elites of the period.77 As 
one war veteran lamented, “No one really wins in a war, when you lose your relatives, your 
loved ones.…The fact that [Chechen leader Dzhokhar] Dudayev and [Russian President Boris] 
Yeltsin had problems reaching an agreement didn’t mean we had to kill each other. We could 
have agreed, since there were many Chechens who could still benefit from access to Russian 
markets, to Russia....When the war broke out, many young people were euphoric about 
expelling the Russians, but there were lots of mature and thinking folks who resented those 
[political elites] in Grozny as much as those in Moscow.”78  
These interviewees eventually joined the ranks of the insurgents not because of their support for 
Chechen separatism, but in spite of it. These interviewees were driven instead by their deep 
determination to retaliate following an act of violence by Russian forces against a relative, whether it  
was murder or another form of blood insult.79  
 After the start of the Second Chechen War in the fall of 1999, outrage among Chechens critical 
of the republic’s political and military elites appears to have been even more intense than it had been on 
the eve of the first war.80 Through their constant quarreling, Chechen elites squandered the republic’s 
chances of reinforcing its de facto sovereignty during the 1996–99 interwar period. As a result of the 
Chechen-led jihadist invasion of Dagestan in August 1999, they were also widely blamed by the local 
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population for providing Moscow with a pretext to launch a new and even more devastating war.81 
Importantly, most Chechens disapproved of the newly adopted ideology of Salafism,82 which had been 
gradually replacing Chechen nationalism as the leading ideology among leaders of the Chechen 
insurgency.83  
 There was widespread consensus among our interviewees that it was the need for blood 
revenge against Russian troops (and, more recently, against their Chechen proxies) that ultimately 
prompted thousands of Chechens who were initially apolitical, skeptical of Salafism, or even 
anti-separatist to resort to violence.84 Interviews also revealed that, for many, support for the idea 
of Chechen independence did not automatically push them to mobilize. Valuing family survival 
over national independence, some Chechens sought to avoid the mounting hostilities entirely, 
choosing instead to stay behind and care for their loved ones.85 Against this background, it was a 
relative’s murder by incumbent forces that pushed would-be avengers to mobilize. As one former 
veteran stated, “In the beginning, no one was really willing to go to war....After all, we all had 
families, households, elderly parents to care for. But when your younger brother is killed in an air 
strike, what are you supposed to do? Stay home and watch TV? For us Chechens, there was no 
other choice but to take up arms and seek revenge.”86 Another explained, “Of course, it’d be great 
to have an independent country. And [since the 1990s] many have sacrificed their lives for its 
sake, as has been done many times in our [Chechen] history....But there is a difference between 
fighting for independence or fighting to avenge a murdered relative in whose veins your own 
blood circulates. The former is praiseworthy, but it’s still a matter of personal choice....The 
latter is a must for a true Chechen.”87 
 
  Violent mobilization often has a snowball-like effect. This has certainly been true Chechnya, 
where the murder or fatal injury of one individual has, in some cases, led to the mobilization of 
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multiple avengers from within the same nekye or family. Interviewees stated that the raping of Chechen 
women, in particular, has generated high numbers of avengers, ranging from five to ten individuals per 
incident.88 Consequently, this cycle of offense and retaliation provided for a nearly continuous influx of 
fresh recruits into the insurgency.89 This was especially true in the patriarchal mountainous areas in the 
south of the country, where violent mobilization evolved along clan (gar, nekye) lines, and thus 
generated more avengers.90 In urban areas, violent mobilization for the sake of individual retaliation 
tended to be increasingly confined to nuclear families, producing smaller numbers of avengers.91  
 As discussed earlier, blood revenge has historically targeted either the perpetrator of an act of 
violence or his patrilineally delineated male relatives—members of the same clan, all of whom can be 
identified. The practice has been subject to strict rules, which stipulate that targeting those unrelated to 
the culprit through blood kinship should be avoided at all cost.  The deployment of Russian army units 
in Chechnya changed the situation inasmuch as would-be avengers were less capable of identifying and  
locating the actual offenders and their relatives. Nevertheless, locals’ efforts to trace the latter’s 
whereabouts and target them for revenge did not cease. Rather, they adapted to the conditions on the 
ground.  
 Interviewees noted that Chechen males primarily sought to exact revenge on members of 
Russian units based near their villages.92   Although they would have preferred to attack those 
directly responsible for an offense, identifying and locating them often proved difficult. As 
Mairbek Vatchagaev, a Chechen historian and eyewitness to the conflict, noted, whenever there 
was the slightest chance of identifying the culprits, “[Chechens] continued to search for them, 
targeting closely dislocated garrisons...Even after the war, there were some cases when they 
[offenders] were located in Russia and assassinated in their apartments..…Megalitres [of vodka] 
were spilled to get the addresses of those in charge of (mop-up) operations in one village or 
another. A lot of attention was paid to finding those who would betray their fellow fighters.”93 
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In contrast to the difficulty of identifying and locating individual offenders, seeking blood 
revenge against entire Russian units proved easier. Zachistkas (mop-ups), locally conducted military 
operations, and artillery shelling were the most common sources of indiscriminate violence by Russian 
units. Importantly, these forms of violence were relatively easily ascribed by local Chechens to the 
garrisons of the Russian army, which were dislocated close to their villages and which were 
usually responsible for targeting Chechens. Therefore, in the aftermath of an offense, blood 
revenge–driven violence tended to be as much selective as actual information allowed it to be, 
with avengers retaliating against the narrowest possible group of offenders they were capable of 
identifying. Accordingly, the majority of blood revenge–driven violence was directed against 
those Russian units that were held responsible by local Chechens for committing particular 
offenses or were perceived by locals as the actual culprits of such offenses.94  
Nevertheless, most avengers soon came to regard all Chechnya-based Russian troops as 
potential targets of blood revenge–driven violence.  According to our interviewees, two factors explain 
this change: (1) the increased flow of avengers into established insurgent units and (2) the avengers’ 
gradual submission to the ideology prevailing within these units—predominantly ethnonationalist in 
the First Chechen War and Salafism in the Second Chechen War.95 As one former insurgent stated, “If 
you’re a young guy and you join a jamaat [a Salafi-jihadi group] and find yourself encircled [in your 
daily life] by dozens of brothers in arms, your new family, it’s natural that over time you embrace their 
ideology.”96  
Unable to target offenders on their own, individual avengers joined established insurgent 
groups.97 As members of these units, most avengers underwent gradual ideological indoctrination, 
increasingly associating themselves with the political goals of their group.98 Over time, this in-group 
ideological indoctrination led them to target Russian troops as a whole, moving them beyond their 
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initial aim of avenging an individual, apolitical offense. Yet despite citing political motivations for their 
violent engagement, such as Chechen independence or the establishment of a Salafist theocracy in the 
region, many interviewees still cited the need for blood revenge as the most immediate cause of their 
violent mobilization.99 
   
Blood Feud and the Outcomes of the Chechen Wars  
Blood revenge–driven mass mobilization played an immense role in the Chechen insurgents’ de facto 
victory over the Russian military in the First Chechen War. Accurate statistical data on the role of blood 
revenge in Chechen campaigns are, however, highly difficult to obtain given the impossibility of 
ensuring sample representativeness among former insurgents. Nevertheless, qualitative data collected 
for this study suggest that the blood revenge served as an effective cause of violent mobilization for 
thousands of Chechen males.  
 Evidence suggests that the majority of Chechen insurgent forces from 1994 to 1996 consisted of 
volunteers who joined the fighting in the latter stages of the conflict. According to some estimates, 
Chechen combatants, predominantly those serving in the Chechen army and other formal armed units 
(e.g., the so-called Presidential Guard and the Abkhaz Battalion), numbered up to 4,000 men at the 
onset of the war. This figure skyrocketed shortly after the start of the hostilities, reaching 12,000 to 
18,000 during the latter phases of the armed conflict.100 This increase ran parallel with the growing 
scope of indiscriminate violence deployed by the Russian military, and the resulting increase in the 
number of combatant and noncombatant casualties—producing an increasingly high number of 
committed fighters from among local men.101 The data imply that Chechen separatist authorities made 
no effort to recruit males into the insurgency movement, nor did they force Chechen males to join 
insurgent units.102 Large-scale mobilization into rebel ranks, which occurred largely without forced 
recruitment, suggests that individual recruits were highly motivated to join the fighting. Given that the 
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majority of recruits originated from Chechnya’s mountainous areas—which are more socially 
conservative, clan-based, and notorious for their reliance on blood revenge—rather than from urban 
areas and the republic’s lowlands, blood revenge could be expected to figure prominently among other 
causes of violent mobilization. This conclusion has been confirmed by numerous interviewees, who 
acknowledged that blood revenge was the primary motivation for many Chechen men who volunteered 
in the war effort as the conflict escalated.  
 The Second Chechen War displayed many of the same features, including the crucial role of 
blood revenge-based violent mobilization. In this conflict, blood revenge appears to have also stemmed 
the tide of the insurgency, although this time in the opposite direction. In spite of—or because of—the 
massive use of indiscriminate violence in the early 2000s, the Russian military failed to break the 
backbone of the local resistance movement. And as in the first war, high casualties resulting from the 
Russians’ extensive use of indiscriminate violence generated more avengers. Consequently, as a 
Russian combat general reported from Chechnya as late as in 2004, Russian troops were “so busy just 
trying to ensure their own security” that they “almost never can counter the resurgent guerrillas.”103 
 The gradual deployment since the early 2000s of pro-Russian Chechen paramilitary forces, 
kadyrovtsy,104 as part of what came to be known as Moscow’s policy of Chechenization, replaced the 
Russian military as the main counterinsurgency force in the republic. The use of kadyrovtsy units 
transformed the conflict into a civil war.105 Deployed by Moscow and their Chechen allies en masse 
against insurgents, their (alleged) supporters, and relatives in sweeping and atrocious 
counterinsurgency operations and attacks that claimed hundreds of lives,106 kadyrovtsy, pro-Moscow 
Chechen authorities, and their relatives soon found themselves trapped in vicious cycles of blood feuds 
with insurgents, their relatives, and the families of their (alleged) supporters.107 As a Chechen political 
scientist has explained, Chechenization gradually “pitched a [Chechen] family against a family, a clan 
against a clan.…Dragged into blood feuds with their neighbors and fellow countrymen, the Chechens 
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[kadyrovtsy's relatives] now had no other choice than to fight this war until the very end,“ turning into 
Moscow's loyal subjects.108 In consequence, kadyrovtsy soon turned into an increasingly fierce 
counterinsurgent force, backed by dozens of thousands of their relatives and loyal to Moscow as the 
main guarantor of their survival.109 This meant that the Russian military’s hypothetical withdrawal from 
the republic as a result of a failed counterinsurgency would inevitably lead to large-scale physical 
liquidation of kadyrovtsy, their relatives, and pro-Moscow Chechen authorities at the hands insurgents, 
their relatives, and the relatives of the insurgents’ (alleged) supporters.110 By and large, the custom of 
blood revenge, practiced by both pro-insurgent and pro-Moscow Chechens, tore at Chechnya’s social 
fabric, polarizing the population and creating a determined force loyal to Moscow that has stemmed the 
tide of the local insurgency. Today, Chechnya—the erstwhile epicenter of insurgency since the mid-
1999s to the mid-2000s—is one of the safest areas of the North Caucasus, experiencing less violence 
than Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, and periodically even tiny Ingushetia.111 The gradual decline of 
the Chechnya-based insurgency during the Second Chechen War was nevertheless due to the 
incumbent’s instrumentalization of the custom of blood revenge by instigating intra-Chechen 
hostilities rather than the ineffectiveness of the custom itself.  
 
 
Conclusion  
The Chechen practice of blood revenge is similar to the same practice elsewhere in the world. Blood 
revenge is understood in Chechnya as deeply embedded in individual, family, and clan honor. It is 
always reciprocal. Following the Russian military intervention in 1994, blood revenge began to be 
widely used by thousands of Chechens in their quest to avenge their murdered, injured, or raped 
relatives, and to restore their individual and clan honor. Blood revenge is thus not confined to the realm 
of communal infighting, but it may also involve out-group members.  
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 In many cases, the need to exact blood revenge took precedence over an individual’s political 
views, or lack thereof. Chechen males previously skeptical of or ambivalent toward the idea of 
Chechen independence were impelled to avenge following a relative’s murder. Others sought to “wash 
off” a deeply felt offense, despite previous desires of avoiding the hostilities. Similarly, for many latent 
supporters of Chechen independence, an act of offense inflicted upon themselves or their relatives was 
the immediate cause of their violent mobilization. Although many Chechens were driven to violence by 
their personal and apolitical need to retaliate, their subsequent membership in insurgent groups led 
them to embrace the dominant ideology of those insurgent organizations. Avengers provided for the 
constant flow of manpower to insurgent groups. 
 As a rule, would-be avengers sought to exact blood revenge against the actual culprits of 
offense. Yet inability to identify and localize culprits prompted avengers to shift their focus to the 
narrowest circle of individuals associated with a particular offense: a military unit. Would-be avengers 
unable to link a particular offense to an offender sought to exact revenge on the Russian military as a 
whole, a shift that was also affected by avengers' ideological indoctrination as members of insurgent 
organizations. Wartime anonymity thus did not lead to the abandonment of the practice of blood 
revenge. Rather, the enemy image was broadened to include an entire military force.  
 The findings of this article suggest that blood revenge is an effective, albeit largely 
underexplored, cause of violent mobilization in irregular wars. Foreign entities engaged in irregular 
wars, such as the United States, NATO, and Russia, continue to underestimate the potential for violent 
mobilization posed by blood revenge. Yet a better understanding of how blood revenge generates 
violent mobilization may help to grasp the visceral causes of armed conflict in societies that still 
practice this age-old custom. 
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